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Intertranslatability, Theoretical Equivalence, and Perversion  1
Jack Woods 
ItÕs increasingly common to claim that logic isnÕt special, that a logical theory is just a theory like any 
other (Hjortland 2016, Priest 2014, Russell 2014, and Williamson 2017.) These anti-exceptionalist views 
use theoretical virtues of alternative logicsÑsimplicity, strength, etc.Ñin order to evaluate them 
analogously to how we evaluate scientific theories.  In doing so, itÕs helpful to know when two seemingly 2
distinct theories are really differently formulated versions of the same theory, saying the same things in 
different ways. In other words, itÕs helpful to have an account of theoretical equivalence between logics. 
 For example, axiomatic and natural deduction presentations of classical propositional logic 
initially look quite different even though theyÕre intuitively theoretically equivalent. Now, natural 
deduction is less metatheoretically tractable while axiomatic accounts do worse at revealing obvious 
entailments. Neither disadvantage is problematic once weÕre justified in treating them as theoretically 
equivalent; perceived disadvantages of a logical theory that are merely presentational can be ignored in 
calculating its overall virtues.  
 We have options when developing a notion of theoretical equivalence. One standard way uses 
semantic properties, like having the same set of models, to account for when two logical theories are 
equivalent. However, as the required model theory can only be developed by appealing to significant 
logical resources, many of which are in contention when choosing between logics, itÕs natural for anti-
exceptionalists to prefer less theoretically taxing syntactic accounts of theoretical equivalence. Syntactic 
accounts require lighter metatheoretic resources (roughly a basic theory of syntax) which can often be 
developed in a neutral fashion with resources shared between a pair of logical theories.  Even if we can 3
sometimes use a semantic notion of theoretical equivalence, itÕs useful to have a syntactic notion available 
for cases where the resources necessary to develop the semantic notion are in contention.  
 However, in a recent paper, John Wigglesworth argues that syntactic accounts of theoretical 
equivalence are simply too coarse-grained to explicate any reasonable notion of theoretical equivalence 
 Thanks to Rohan French, Simon Hewitt, Beau Madison Mount, Gil Sagi, Jared Warren, John Wigglesworth, and Gzde 1
Yõldõrõm for helpful discussion. 
 See Woods (forthcoming) for other worries about anti-exceptionalist methodology. 2
 See Woods (forthcoming), Woods (manuscript), and Meadows and Weber (2016) for discussion of these issues. 3
between logics. This because even the best syntactic accounts treat classical and intuitionistic logic as 
theoretically equivalent. Yet no two logical theories could be more obviously distinct than these 
(Wigglesworth forthcoming). His argument works against some syntactic accounts, but it doesnÕt work 
against them all. IÕll show here how to avoid his objection by developing a more adequate and, 
importantly, more discriminating syntactic account of theoretical equivalence.  4
 A standard syntactic account of theoretical equivalence in the philosophy of science uses 
intertranslatability between theoriesÑmappings between sets of sentences closed under classical logicÑ
as the mark of theoretical equivalence. This doesnÕt work for comparing various logics. For one reason, 
we canÕt presume a uniform notion of closure. For another, logics centrally include claims about how 
different claimsÑincluding various hypothetical claimsÑabout the world relate to one another. Whether 
one thinks about this enterprise as worldly or not, this requires us to modify the standard account of 
syntactic equivalence.  We need to modify the standard account of theoretical equivalence so that it 5
captures equivalence between two logical theories instead of between two scientific theories. 
 The first thing to do is to generalize beyond particular closed theories to logics. We treat logics as 
sets of axioms and rules. For a sequent calculus and (some) presentations of natural deduction, this will 
include structural rules like identity, weakening, and cut as well as operational rules governing operations 
on connectives like modus ponens. For axiomatic systems and (some) presentations of natural deduction, 
this will include axioms and operational rules like modus ponens. Since our concern is syntactic theories, 
weÕll use derivabilityÑrepeated application of rulesÑas our closure condition, saying that ψ is in the 
closure of a set of sentences S in a logic L (writing this closure as LS) just in case ψ can be obtained by 
repeated application of the rules characterizing L to sentences in S and the sentences we obtain by such 
application.  6
 IÕll stick with propositional logic as the problems IÕm concerned with are already present there and quantiÞcational theory poses 4
additional difÞculties. 
 A referee (not the one thanked elsewhere in this paper) suggests this is anti-anti-exceptionalist. Not so; itÕs rather the standard 5
rejection of treating a logic-as a merely set of theorems. No one seriously conceives of a logic as a set of theorems anymoreÑ
since, for instance, some non-equivalent logics donÕt have anyÑso this point seems utterly uncontroversial, even given anti-
exceptionalism.
 Treating axioms as a zero-case of applying rules. This general notion of derivability is clear enough for our purposes (and can, 6
of course, be spelled out precisely in the usual ways.) Thanks to a helpful referee for encouraging more generality here.  
 For Wigglesworth, two logical theories L and L* are intertranslatable when, for every set of 
sentences S, there are mappings a1: LS→L*S and a2: L*S→LS, where these mappings commute with 
negation  (i.e. where a1(Âψ)=Âa1(ψ) and analogously for a2.) This generalized intertranslatability account 7
looks initially plausible for explicating theoretical equivalence between logics.   8
 As Wigglesworth demonstrates, though, it faces extensional problems. In light of these, he claims 
that we should give a semantic characterization of theoretical equivalence instead of a syntactic one. This 
might be right if the generalization just mooted was the best syntactic account of theoretical equivalence, 
but it isnÕt. We can avoid WigglesworthÕs conclusion by refining the intertranslatability account of 
theoretical equivalence in three ways: the first involves ensuring a common language, the second 
generalizing the translations, and the third involves demanding that the translations preserve meaning, 
insofar as that can be done in a syntactic setting.   9
 These refinements, though they result in a more stringent notion of theoretical equivalence, are 
natural, philosophically motivated, and do not undermine the light-touch syntactic approach anti-
exceptionalists should favor. Motivating these refinements involves discussing some important issues 
about theoretical equivalence between logics, so the ensuing discussion is important generally, not just as 
a way of avoiding an objection to a particular approach to theoretical equivalence between logics.  
Refinement 1: Ensuring Common Languages 
The problems with WigglesworthÕs target syntactic account start when the languages of the logics 
evaluated are either disjoint or overlapping. For example, p v Âp occurs nowhere in the pure theory of 
conjunction (&) and negation (Â). Suppose we compared this theory with the pure theory of disjunction 
 This constraint is a weakening of the typical requirement that translations commute with logical operations, which isnÕt 7
obviously reasonable when comparing distinct logics. Adopting the weakened constraint doesnÕt eliminate all problems 
(Feferman 2000: A.4); for an immediately pressing one, note that not all logics contain primitive negation operators! We avoid 
this problem by means of the generalizable commutation condition mooted in the Þrst reÞnement.
 Of course, there's a wealth of material on translations between consequence relations which could also be exploited in this 8
regard. I'll stick with developing Wigglesworth's account, but interested readers are encouraged to consult Wojcicki (1988) and 
references within. 
 French (forthcoming) develops an account of Ònotational varianceÓÑa slightly stronger notion of equivalenceÑrequiring that a 9
equivalent logics stay equivalent under uniform increases in background logical strength. This is an interesting additional 
condition to impose, but itÕs perhaps too stringent for theoretical equivalence. I hope to discuss this elsewhere. 
(v) and negation. By the syntactic account given above, weÕd need to compare the closure of every set of 
sentences involving v and Â under both the pure theory of disjunction and negation and the pure theory of 
conjunction and negation. But since the latter doesnÕt contain any rules for disjunction, presumably {p v 
Âp} has a nigh-trivial closure in the latter theory.  
 For a more worrisome example, let B be the pure theory of conjunction, disjunction, and negation 
and B* the intuitive notational variant which treats v as conjunction and & as disjunction (modifying the 
corresponding rules in the obvious way). Now consider the effects of closing a tautology (in B) under B 
and B*. B{p v Âp} contains all and only the classical tautologies in &, v, and Â; B*{p v Âp} contains all 
sentences since we can derive both p and Âp using ÒconjunctionÓ elimination and then apply reductio ad 
absurdum. B and B* thus arenÕt intertranslatable in WigglesworthÕs sense. But theyÕre intuitively 
notational variants and hence theoretically equivalent; so the lack of a shared languageÑin particular, a 
shared set of logical constants (and formation rules)Ñcauses serious problems.  10
 The trouble, obviously, is that we canÕt assume a shared language with which to populate S. But 
the whole idea was to test the effect of each logic on arbitrary bits of common content (i.e. on various S). 
There are two obvious solutions for this problem. First, we could treat intertranslatability as relative to an 
existing pair of mappings between the logical expressions of one language and the logical expressions of 
another (presuming for simplicity that the non-logical expressions are common. ) This allows us to 11
formulate S in a neutral fashion, at least relative to our presumed mappings between logical expressions. 
We then say L and L* are theoretically equivalent, relative to a pair of mappings t,u, just in case there are 
mappings f and g where for every set of sentences S in the language of L, f: LS→L*t(S) and every S in the 
language of L*, g: L*S→Lu(S) (where these mappings commute with negation). 
 Second, we could apply our main translations to S as well, modifying our account accordingly. 
WeÕd then say that L and L* are theoretically equivalent just in case there are mappings f and g between L 
and L* where for every set of sentences S in the language of L, f: LS→L*f(S) and every S in the language of 
L*, g: L*S→Lg(S).  
 I focus on correspondence between logical constants; the corresponding correspondence of formation rules is obvious.10
 We could also drop this assumption and relativize our translations to an existing pair of mappings between the languages in 11
general; we ignore this complication by presuming a shared Þeld of non-logical content.
 Either way, the key move is ensuring some type of common content for S so that the perhaps 
differential effects of closing S under each logic can be evaluated. Accordingly, we apply these mappings 
only to S, leaving untouched the role of each logic in closing the resulting sets of sentences under 
derivability. We require of translations between these results that they preserve the condition of 
commuting with negation so as to avoid entirely perverse pairs of translations and presumed mappings. 
 Each solution yields non-trivial notions of theoretical equivalence, but I prefer the first. To see 
why, note that B* can be viewed two ways: as a notational variant of B or as the radical view permitting 
inferring disjuncts from disjunctions. The second solution doesnÕt distinguish these interpretations since 
there are mappings f and g between B and B* such that for every S in B, f: BS→B*f(S) and every S in B*, g: 
B*S→Bg(S). So theyÕre theoretically equivalent by the second solution, no matter what we intended B* to 
be. This is too coarse-grained; these distinct understandings of B* should be distinguished. 
 The first solution distinguishes them. Let t map each connective in B to itself; let t* swap & and 
v. The closure of S under B* then depends on whether weÕre relativizing our notion of theoretical 
equivalence to t or t* (note that we havenÕt modified these rules at all).  For example, consider the rule of 12
ÒdisjunctionÓ elimination. As t* translates p & Âp as p v Âp, disjunction elimination in B*ÑÒto infer ψ 
from ψ v φÓÑis just a notational variant of conjunction elimination presuming t*. Presuming t instead, 
ÒdisjunctionÓ elimination permits inferring ÒdisjunctsÓ from ÒdisjunctionsÓ in one of the two theories.   13
 So, for our first refinement, given mappings t,u between the logical expressions of B and B*, letÕs 
require of theoretically equivalent logics B and B* that there are mappings f, g such that for every set of 
sentence S in the language of B, f: BS→B*t(S) and for every set S in the language of B* g: B*S→B*u(S). 
 We could narrow down which mapping to presume, drawing on something like the counterpart-theoretic story in Warren 12
(2015a, S. 4) or that the resulting translations be nice in the sense spelled out below.  Alternatively, we could let presumed 
mappings vary with our background purpose; after all, in practice some such mapping between logical expressions, often the 
identity mapping, will be implicitly presumed. ÔAbsolutizedÕ versions, such as the notion of theoretical equivalence given by 
existentially or universally quantifying out the relativity of our preferred notion, are either extremely weak or strong, as our 
example of B and B*  shows. I hope to take up these matters elsewhere. Thanks to a helpful referee for discussion.
 This solution, being syntactic, doesnÕt single out the bizarre theory; it just shows that there are validities in one theory which 13
are countervalidities in the other. But thatÕs all thatÕs needed to carve the two apart. So even though there's a semantic-ish 
presumption of common content for S underlying our choice of a presumed mapping, our deÞnition itself is still fully syntactic. 
This is good news for the anti-exceptionalist. 
where f,g,t, and u commute with negation in the sense that f(Âψ) = t(Â)f(ψ) and g(Âψ) = u(Â)g(ψ).  A 14
little work shows that B and B* arenÕt theoretically equivalent when we presume t. Even less work shows 
that they are when we swap t* for t.  
 Since I prefer finer-grained approaches, I work with the first solution, treating theoretical 
equivalence as theoretical equivalence relative to mappings of the logical expressions in one language to 
the logical expressions of another.  In light of our target case below, weÕll assume below that t and u are 15
both the identity mapping unless otherwise specified.  
Refinement 2: Generalizing the Translations 
The second refinement involves the generality of f and g. Again, the usual treatment of theories as a 
logically closed set of sentences doesnÕt naturally apply to logic itself since logics centrally include 
claims about how claims about the world relate to each other. Wigglesworth accounts for this by treating 
two logics as theoretically equivalent when we have translations between the results of closing any set of 
sentences S, under both logics, into one another. Intuitively, S then plays the role of a set of premises and 
LS the set of its consequences.  16
 This definition, though, permits using different translations for each S. These local translations 
might use special features of the content of S, instead of what each logic says about S, in translating 
between logics. For example, let D contain ψ v Âψ for every atomic formula ψ in our language. D, 
understood intuitionistically, is an extremely strong set of premises. It amounts to the decidability of all 
atomic formulas. Understood classically, D is trivial (since classical logic presumes that all formulas are 
ÒdeterminateÓ.) So intuitively they ÒsayÓ quite different things. However, since the classical and 
intuitionistic closures of D are the same, we can use the identity map to translate between the intuitionistic 
 We could also require our presumed mapping between logical expressions be nice in the sense of preseving non-logical content 14
and guaranteeing  commutation for all logical expressions for a naturally more stringent notion of theoretical equivalence. See 
below. 
 Translations between sets of logical expressions can be complex; we might map p v q to Â(Âp & Âq). Details would distract 15
and arenÕt important here. What I say below is adaptable to the second solution; those who favor the coarse-grained are invited to 
read the discussion accordingly.
 Again, I follow WigglesworthÕs closure-based presentation throughout though we could reframe the discussion using the 16
relevant derivability relationship without any loss. 
and classical closures of S, even though it isnÕt generally adequate to translate between intuitionistic and 
classical logic. ItÕs only because of the presence of excluded middle for all atomic formulas in D that the 
identity translation suffices. 
 Permissive accounts of translation like WigglesworthÕs do reasonably well at capturing when two 
logically closed sets of sentences say the same thing, but badly at capturing when two logical theories 
generally ÒsayÓ the same thing. This last, though, is what theoretical equivalence between logics should 
capture. We can capture this by using general translations: mappings a1, a2 such that for every set of 
sentences S (in each language respectively), a1: LS→L*S and a2: L*S→LS.  We turn now to 17
WigglesworthÕs particular counterexample to syntactic accounts as a warm-up to our third and most 
important refinement.  
WigglesworthÕs Counterexample 
WigglesworthÕs example exploits standard translations of classical logic (C) into intuitionistic logic (I) 
(due to Glivenko, Gdel, Gentzen, and others) where, for an eponymously labeled translation g and 
derivability relations ⊢C and ⊢I: 
 1: ⊢C ψ ↔ g(ψ). 
 2: ⊢I g(ψ) ↔ Â Â g(ψ). 
 3: ⊢C ψ only if ⊢I  g(ψ). 
For concreteness, weÕll take as our g the mapping which takes p to Â Âp, (p v q) to Â (Âg(p) & Âg(q)), Âp 
to Âg(p), and p→q to g(p)→g(q). ItÕs an easy exercise to show that g commutes with negation, so itÕs a 
general translation of classical logic into intuitionistic logic. As for the other direction, since (pure) 
intuitionistic (propositional) logic is a sublogic of classical, we can use the identity map as our translation. 
As g and the identity map translate, in the above sense, between the results of closing any set of sentences 
under intuitionistic and classical logic, WigglesworthÕs explication of syntactic accounts of theoretical 
equivalence treats intuitionistic and classical logic as equivalent. But they're not. So itÕs inadequate.  
 WigglesworthÕs favored translation between classical and intuitionistic logic is general in this sense. Remember that weÕre 17
suppressing the presumed mappings between logical expressions unless it matters.
 Should we conclude that syntactic explications of theoretical equivalence between logics are 
inadequate in general? This would be premature. To criticize all syntactic accounts this way,  weÕd need to 
show that WigglesworthÕs is the best syntactic account of theoretical equivalence. But itÕs not; thereÕs a 
further natural refinement which solves WigglesworthÕs problem and results in a more satisfying overall 
account of theoretical equivalence. The key idea is requiring that two theoretically equivalent theories 
donÕt ÒsayÓ quite different things. Even syntactic accounts of intertranslatability should aim to preserve 
content between translations. To make good on this requirement, of course, we need a syntactic criterion 
which plausibly captures when two logical theories say the same things. Happily, there is one. 
Refinement 3: Avoiding Perverse ÒTranslationsÓ 
 When we close a set of sentences S and its logical-expression-mapping image t(S) under L and 
L*, two theoretically equivalent logics, we want the results of translating the L*-closure of t(S) into L to 
be, in an intuitive sense, L-equivalent to the L-closure of S (analogously for translating Lu(S) into L*S). 
Otherwise, assuming L and L* really are theoretically equivalent, our translation from L*t(S)  into LS  has 
perverted SÕs content (relative to the mapping t); weÕve gained or lost information in passing back and 
forth between the two logics. ItÕs then only a translation in the recherch sense of a minimally adequate 
embedding of L*t(S) into LS, not a translation in the fuller sense which would legitimate using 
intertranslatablity as an explication of two logics saying the same thing.   
 Consider an analogy. Suppose weÕve what purports to be an English translation of Saatleri 
Ayarlama Enstits. Suppose further weÕve a mapping between English and Turkish such that, for every 
sentence in The Time Regulation Institute, thereÕs a corresponding sentence in Saatleri Ayarlama 
Enstits. Does this guarantee that everything said in Saatleri Ayarlama Enstits is said in The Time 
Regulation Institute? No, obviously not. For example, our mapping might send two subtly different ways 
of apologizing in Turkish, ÒzgnmÓ and Òzr dilerimÓ, to ÒIÕm sorryÓ. This would be a perverted 
translation (though we often canÕt do much better in practice.) 
 For a truly adequate translation, we need that for every sentence in Saatleri Ayarlama Enstits, 
thereÕs a Turkish-equivalent sentence in the set of Turkish sentences obtained by applying our mapping to 
The Time Regulation Institute. If there isnÕt, then our translation has perverted the meaning of the Turkish 
original and, corresponding, the content of the two novels arenÕt the same. As we want our account of 
theoretical equivalence between logics to capture when their content is the same, we should demand that 
the translations between them arenÕt perverse. 
 Translations between classical and intuitionistic logic fails this constraint; g, for instance, 
effectively takes p v Âp to Â(Âp & ÂÂp), but while we can derive Â(Âp & ÂÂp) from p v Âp 
intuitionistically, we cannot so derive p v Âp from Â(Âp & ÂÂp)Ñi.e. theyÕre not intuitionistically 
equivalent. From an intuitionistic point of view, g is perverse (presuming the reasonable mappings 
between logical expressions). Let S = {p v Âp}. IS then contains all the classical tautologies involving p.  
p v Âp, intuitionistically, is tantamount to the claim that p is decidable and thus that classical reasoning 
can be used concerning it. g purges every classical tautology in CS  by replacing it with an intuitionistic 
tautology in g(CS); no solely classical tautologies remain. In particular, g(CS) intuitively says nothing 
about decidability. So IS and g(CS) say quite different things, witnessed by the lack of intuitionistic 
equivalence between them. g is perverse.  
 I propose to lay lack of perversion down as a further constraint on theoretical equivalence. So two 
logics L, L* are theoretically equivalent, relative to presumed mappings t,u, if there are general 
translations aL: LG→L*t(G) and aL*: L*G→Lu(G) where, given any set of sentences S in the language of L, LS 
is L-equivalent to aL*(L*t(S)) and similarly for aL*. What is it to be L-equivalent in this context? ItÕs to be 
such that for every sentence ψ in LS thereÕs a sentence φ in aL*(L*t(G)) such that L{φ} = L{ψ}. Likewise for 
L*.  Essentially, weÕre using the notion of logical closure to guarantee that the results of translation of 18
the classical theory of G into an intuitionistic theory is intuitionistically equivalent to the intuitionistic 
theory of G.  
 We can call this constraint ANTI-PERVERSION: any pair of logics L and L* that further satisfy this 
condition will be such that by each of their lights, the L and L* closure of any set of sentences (relative to 
 This baroque formulation avoids explicitly appealing to entailment. Wigglesworth reasonably complains about such appeals by 18
Glymour-style accounts of theoretical equivalence in terms of deÞnitional extensions (see Glymour 2013, Barrett and Halvorson 
2016, McSweeney 2016). We avoid WigglesworthÕs objection by using the same technology he accepts in developing toy 
syntactic accounts of theoretical equivalence for criticism.  
the mapping between logical constants) will be the same, up to interderivability.  This means that any 19
two theoretically equivalent logics L, L* will be such that any theory formulated in L has an L-equivalent 
theory formulated in L* and vice versa. This is a comforting result; it shows that two logics theoretically 
equivalent in our refined sense really do say the same thing about various bits of content. 
Upshot 
As just pointed out, WigglesworthÕs translations are perverse and, in fact, there is no non-perverse pair of 
general translations aI: IG→CG and aC: CG→IG.  
 pf. Presume the identity mapping t between logical constants of C and I. Any general translation  
 aC needs to send the sentence p v Âp, which is a member of CA for any set A, to something  
 intuitionistically weaker since C{} contains p v Âp and I{} contains nothing as intuitionistically  
 strong. This holds for all sentences intuitionistically equivalent to p v Âp. Now let G be {p v Âp}.  
 Since C{} = C{p v Âp} our general translation of CG, aC(CG) contains only things intuitionistically  
 weaker than p v Âp. So there will be no sentence φ in aC(CG) such that I{φ} = I{p v Âp}. 
Note this reasoning works mutatis mutandis against the first way out described in our first refinement or, 
analogously, when using g as our t as well as using it as our translation: g takes p v Âp effectively to Â(Âp 
& ÂÂp) and, of course, C{} = C{Â(Âp & ÂÂp)}. So, again, aC(Cg(G)) doesnÕt contain any sentence φ such that 
I{φ} = I{p v Âp}. We can also rule out non-perverse nice translations using a result of Wojcicki (exploited for 
similar purposes by French (forthcoming) and Humberstone (2000)). ÔNiceÕ here means that atomic non-
logical content is mapped to itself, that all logical expressions commute (relative to the presumed 
mapping), and that the translations are inverse to each other.  ANTI-PERVERSION is thus robust enough to 20
exclude Wigglesworth-type examples across a range of different earlier refinements.  
 See Segerberg (1982: 43) for an analogous constraint on syntactic equivalence. As French (forthcoming) notes, SegerbergÕs 19
formulation of this condition doesnÕt presume any kind of compositionality (as I do in reÞnement 1 above), resulting in a weaker 
notion of equivalence. ANTI-PERVERSION also resembles a constraint discussed by Barrett and Halvorson (2016: DeÞnition 5). It 
differs by requiring that the equivalence between a sentence of intuitionistic logic and the translated version of the corresponding 
sentence in classical logic hold without any side-premises instead being provable ÒlocallyÓ from each IS (as well as avoiding the 
use of the biconditional since our respective logics might not contain biconditionals, let alone biconditionals that mean the same 
thing.) This is appropriate to the setting of general translations, as discussed above, and in light of the application to logic itself 
instead of non-logical theories. Note that p v Âp ↔ Â(Âp & ÂÂp) is in I{p v Âp}. So the Barrett and Halvorson reÞnement is 
insufÞcient to avoid WigglesworthÕs examples, even though it and ANTI-PERVERSION are similarly inspired. 
 Roughly, Wojcicki shows that Âp would have to be translated, by a nice translation, into one of six inequivalent formulas in a 20
supra-intuitionistic logic. Since we can derive q from p, Âp classically, we need to be able to derive the translation of q from  p 
and the translation of Âp in that logic. But none of the six potential translations will do. See op. cit. for details.
 Nevertheless, there are intuitively equivalent pairs of logics which satisfy ANTI-PERVERSION; 
consider B and B* under the t* mapping described above. For any sentence in the translation of B*t*({p v 
Âp}) (= B*{p & Âp}) back into B, there will be a sentence in B{p v Âp} which is B-equivalent to it. And 
conversely. Consider also our opening example of natural deduction and axiomatic presentations of 
classical logic.  
 For a more involved and interesting example, we can use the De Morgan equivalencesÑfor both 
our connective mapping and our general translationÑin order to translate the conjunction negation 
fragment of classical logic into the disjunction negation fragment and conversely while satisfying ANTI-
PERVERSION.  
 Finally, note that we can take a range of interesting non-classical logics, such as intuitionistic, and 
show that adding additional axioms yields theoretical equivalence with classical logic. For instance, 
intuitionistic logic with the addition of A v ÂA, as an axiom, for every piece of non-logical content A is 
theoretically equivalent, in our sense, to classical logic. As is the addition of ÂÂA→A for every piece of 
non-logical content A. And, of course, they're theoretically equivalent to each other.  21
 So there is a useful, interesting, and non-trivial syntactic notion of theoretical equivalence, 
captured by adding ANTI-PERVERSION to general intertranslatability (relativizing the whole to a mapping 
between the logical expressions so as to guarantee that our sets of sentences can be formulated in a 
ÔneutralÕ language) which distinguishes clearly theoretically inequivalent logics like classical and 
intuitionistic logic while not distinguishing clearly theoretically equivalent logics like the disjunction 
negation and conjunction negation fragments of classical logic. It might not be a perfect notion of 
theoretical equivalenceÑthere are well-known bizarre results to using syntactic notions like this to 
capture theoretical equivalence Ñbut there simply may be no perfect explication of our intuitive ideas 22
about sameness of content. The notion I've articulated serves in many cases to do the work a notion of 
theoretical equivalence should do in comparing a pair of logics in an anti-exceptionalist framework. 
 See Woods (forthcoming) for details of this strategy in bolstering the strength of non-classical logics. 21
 See Niebergall (2000) and French (forthcoming) for discussion. See also Warren (2014b: objection 4) for discussion of 22
loosening the constraints on interpretation and problems lurking thereabouts. 
 Correspondingly, none of this shows that WigglesworthÕs suggested notion of theoretical 
equivalence for logical theories, in terms of categorical equivalence, isnÕt a useful and interesting one.  23
But IÕve shown that not all syntactic notions of theoretical equivalence are hopeless in explicating the 
some form of theoretical equivalence between various logical alternatives. 
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